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ABSTRACT

The heroin trade is a vital part of the Afghan economy. The heroin trade in
Afghanistan has represented 40% to 50% of the country's entire gross domestic product
for the past 30 years. The aim of this study was to examine the heroin trade as a circular
circuit. Disrupt or break the circuit and the heroin trade comes to a halt. A disruption in
the drug trade is also a disruption for the insurgency since the majority of the
insurgency's funding is generated by the heroin trade. Historically, there have been times
when neighboring borders were closed, poppy crops failed, or eradication efforts were
stepped up. These all caused disruptions in the heroin trade and slowed the flow of
heroin leaving Afghanistan and the flow of money going back into the country. By
studying the heroin trade from this circular perspective, law enforcement will be able to
initiate ways to step up anti-narcotic efforts on multiple fronts. This will stem the flow of
heroin leaving Afghanistan and the money coming back in, with an end goal of ending
the Afghan heroin trade overalL Previous studies have focused on only one aspect of the
Afghan heroin trade. Using a multi-pronged approach offers the most options for law
enforcement to launch anti-narcotic efforts against the drug lords and traffickers.

Keywords: Afghanistan, criminology, heroin trade, circular, disruption, insurgency,
destabilization, corruption, drug trade
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Introduction

Afghanistan is at the heart of the illegal transnational heroin trade emanating from
the region referred to as the Golden Crescent (Medler, 2005; Chouvy, 2006). The Golden
Crescent is comprised of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 was the start of the modern transnational heroin trade (Medler,
2005). The mujahidin resistance fighters to the Soviet invasion needed money to
purchase weapons to fight the Soviets. Weapons were sold and sent to mujahidin fighters
by the US government, starting with the Carter administration. The volume of weapons
sold and sent to Afghanistan increased during the Reagan administration (Medler, 2005).
The majority of the funds to purchase these weapons were made from the illegal
heroin trade. Previous studies of the Soviet occupation have shown that the United States
was not actively involved in the heroin trade, however, Medler (2005) states, "there were
extensive sins of omission," by the United States (Medler, 2005, p. 275). These sins of
omission reflected the United States' Cold War strategy against the Soviet Union, where
Afghanistan was used as a political battleground by the United States. The United States
averted its eyes from the illegal heroin trade and focused on the damage that the
mujahidin fighters could do to the Soviets (Medler, 2005).
These sins of omission continued with the US invasion of Afghanistan in late
2001 and through the first few years of the Afghan occupation (Jones, 2008). In 2001,
approximately 350 United States Special Forces soldiers, 100 Central Intelligence
Agency officers and 15,000 Afghan soldiers overthrew the Taliban regime in less than
three months (Jones, 2008). The United States suffered one dozen fatalities during the
initial overthrow. Between 2002 and 2006, the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent
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groups began a sustained effort with the goal of overthrowing the legitimate Afghan
government, which was supported by coalition forces (Jones, 2008).
Previous studies have shown that during this period of time the numbers of
attacks by insurgents rose by more than 400% and the numbers of deaths from these
attacks rose by more than 800 % (Jones, 2008). There was a substantial increase of
violence in 2005 and 2006 where the numbers of insurgent attacks spiked. The number
of suicide bombings rose from 27 to 139; the number of remotely detonated bombings
rose from 783 to 1677; and armed attacks rose from 1,558 to 4,542 (Jones, 2008). Also,
between 2006 and 2007 insurgent-initiated attacks rose an additional 27%. The result of
these increases in violence was a lack of security for the Afghan population as well as
coalition forces and a breeding ground for the drug trade and insurgency to flourish
(Jones, 2008).
When the United States-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, combating the
drug trade was not a primary focus of the coalition forces. However, as the years passed
and the insurgency grew and attacks on the Afghan government and coalition forces
mounted, eyes turned to where the insurgency was acquiring funding. In 2004, John
Walters, who was the Director for White House Office of Drug Control Policy said,
"drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan are undermining the rule of law and
putting money in the pockets of the terrorists we are trying to neutralize," (Bagley, 2004,
p.5). A connection was made between the insurgency and the drug trade. The opium
trade funded terrorism, inhibited reconstruction and created a financial and locally
supported power base for the insurgency to launch attacks on coalition forces, further
destabilizing the government and the country (Taylor, 2004; Johnson, 2007).

2
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Destabilization of Afghanistan is the goal of the insurgency_ Destabilization of the
Afghan government benefits both the insurgency and the drug lords. The poppies that
produce heroin are grown throughout Afghanistan, however, the majority of cultivation is
concentrated in the southern and eastern regions of the country (UNODC, 2003; UNODC
2005; UNODC, 2006; Medler, 2005). These regions are where the drug lords reign
supreme and the legitimate Afghan government is unable to project power or exert rule of
law or control. These regions are also where the insurgency launches its attacks and is
able to avoid capture and detection from government and coalition forces since the
Afghan government is unable to control these areas (Medler, 2005; Jones, 2008).
The insurgents are given financial support by the drug lords. With this financial
support the insurgents purchase weapons, ammunition and bomb-making materials.
Attacks by these well-armed insurgents are launched against Afghan and coalition force
targets. Having such an additional well-armed force at the disposal of the drug lords
benefits their drug trade. As part of the financial support given to the insurgents, the drug
lords now have an additional armed unit, which aids them in transporting heroin out of
Afghanistan. The drug lords can protect their heroin convoys, as well as the convoys of
supplies that are brought back into the country that are required to break down poppies
and produce and refine heroin.
High poppy production equals more poppies to produce heroin. More heroin
means more money to the drug lords. More money for the drug lords means increased
insurgency funding. This allows the insurgency to continue to launch attacks against the
legitimate Afghan government and coalition forces. Combined, these factors further
destabilize the country, thus pushing Afghanistan in the direction both the insurgents and
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the drug lords want the country to go--a destabilized Afghan government. This
environment would allow the drug lords to cultivate, produce, refine, transport and export
heroin with minimal government interference. This would increase profits for the drug
lords and remove one of their largest obstacles, mainly the anti-drug enforcement efforts
from the legitimate Afghan government. The insurgency would then realize their goal of
expelling the foreigners (Coalition forces) and the demise of the legitimate Afghan
government.
Since the goal of the insurgency is to destabilize Afghanistan, the drug lords and
insurgents share a common goal. This common goal provides the basis for why they
work together to destabilize Afghanistan. The motives for why each particular group
wants destabilization are irrelevant. The simple fact that they share this common goal is
the key point to understand and on which to focus. For the drug lords, the heroin trade is
about power, profit and greed. For the insurgents, the heroin trade is viewed as a means
to an end. For these reasons and others, applying Conflict Theory would be appropriate.
Afghan society is divided into areas controlled by the Afghan government and areas
controlled by the drug lords. The two groups have competing ideas and values (Babbie,
2010). The group that reigns over a particular Afghan region determines the societal
controls under which Afghan citizens live.
Research Purpose

The purpose of the current research is to show that the drug trade and the
insurgency are similar to a circular electrical circuit pattern. There are six steps in the
drug trade; these include:
1) cultivation of opium poppies to produce heroin;
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2) production of heroin from the opium;
3) transportation of the heroin out of Afghanistan into the world market;
4) distribution and sales of the heroin in the end cities;
5) subsequent movement of the profits from the sale of the heroin back into
Afghanistan to the drug lords;
6) provision of funds by the drug lords to the insurgents.
A breakdown in anyone of these six areas interrupts the electrical circuit. If such a
breakdown occurs, the drug trade grinds to a halt until the circuit is reestablished.
By examining the relationship between the drug lords and the insurgents as a
circular electrical pattern, insight may be gained into ways to break the circuit and lessen
the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan and the flow of money from the heroin trade back
into Afghanistan. Less money coming back to the drug lords would mean they would
have less money to give the insurgency, therefore restricting the activities of the
insurgents and reducing attacks against coalition forces and the legitimate, freely elected
government of Afghanistan. Rather than Afghanistan becoming a destabilized state
where the heroin trade would continue unabated, Afghanistan would become a stable and
centralized government with the ability to project power and rule of law throughout the
country. Afghanistan would uniformly be able to combat the drug trade and the
insurgency, thereby eliminating two of the largest obstacles Afghanistan faces in
becoming an autonomous self-governing country free from international aid. A stable,
self-sufficient Afghanistan would improve security in the central Asian region, as well as
improving security in Western countries. Afghanistan would no longer be a haven for
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Islamic extremists, and the threat of a terrorist attack from Afghan-based extremists
would be reduced.
Rationale

Studying the relationship between the insurgents and the drug lords and their
common goal of destabilization is vital for the Afghan government's long-term ability to
govern. From determining the allocation of anti-narcotic resources, to being able to
project their legitimate power throughout the country, the Afghan government needs to
understand the relationship between drug lords and the insurgency. Corruption of
Afghan government officials and law enforcement officers is a major problem in
combating the illegal drug trade. The drug lords use their power and money to bribe
government officials and law enforcement officers to look the other way. This corruption
is not only happening in Afghanistan but extends to the surrounding border countries of
Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Research Questions

This study will examine the following questions:
1) Is there is a circular pattern to the Afghan drug trade and the insurgency?
2) What role do destabilization and corruption play in the heroin drug trade and
insurgency in Afghanistan?
Limitations/Delimitations

Some of the limitations of this study include potentially inaccurate figures and
statistics gathered by the United Nations and Drug Enforcement Agency (UNODOC),
due to the illicit nature of the heroin trade. However, the statistics from the World Drug
Report are universally accepted as the best approximations of the actual drug trade in
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Afghanistan. An additional limitation of this research is that first-hand interviews about
the drug trade with actual participants in the trade will not be possible due to the illicit
nature of the trade and the distance to Afghanistan to conduct interviews. These same
limitations apply to the insurgency. The majority of the information for this research will
come from second-source data collected by reporting agencies and previously written
articles, journals and books.
Some of the delimitations of this study that can be controlled will be the various
groups described in this study. Some of the key groups that will be discussed will be the
Afghan drug lords, Afghan insurgents, Afghan law enforcement personnel, Afghan
government officials and Allied coalition force personnel.

Definitions:
Circular electrical circuit pattern to the drug trade - The Afghan drug trade is similar to an
electrical circuit. The drug trade is comprised of six components (see below). If a break
in anyone of these six drug trade components, then the circuit of the drug trade is broken.
The drug trade comes to a halt until the circuit is re-established.
Break in the circuit - A break constitutes any type of anti-narcotic law enforcement
actions aimed at stopping the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan, disrupting distribution
and transportation networks, growing of poppies to produce heroin or the refinement of
poppies into heroin.
Destabilization - Any actions which cause the legitimate government of Afghanistan to
become unstable.
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Insurgency - an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government
through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Farflex, 2011).
The six steps of the drug trade 1) cultivation of opium poppies to produce heroin;
2) production of heroin from the opium;
3) transportation of the heroin out of Afghanistan into the world market;
4) distribution and sales of the heroin in the end cities;
5) subsequent movement of the profits from the sale of the heroin back into
Afghanistan to the drug lords;
6) provision of funds by the Afghan drug lords to the Afghan insurgents.
Taliban - Primary insurgency group most active in Afghanistan
The criminological theory that will be incorporated into the study is part of Karl
Marx's Conflict Theory. Conflict Theory views that society is divided into two or more
groups with competing ideas and values (Babbie, 2010). The group or groups with the
most power make the laws and control society. In the case of Afghanistan, the two
groups are the drug lords and the legitimate Afghan government. In Afghanistan, the
drug lords have the power due to the wealth they obtained from the drug trade. In
Afghanistan, money equals power. Therefore, since the drug lords have power they are
able to control vast regions of Afghanistan. Due to the drug lords' power base and the
inability of the Afghan government to project the rule of law in drug lord controlled
areas, drug lords are able to make the laws in the areas that they control. The legitimate
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Afghan government is only able to impose laws and control society in the regions that
they control. Depending on whose area of control an Afghan citizen inhabits, this will be
a determining factor as to what kind of behavior an Afghan citizen may participate in.
Those citizens in the drug-lord-controlled regions will be more inclined to participate in
poppy cultivation than those citizens in areas controlled by the government.
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Literature Review

Afghanistan is the primary player in the opium trade originating from the area of
Southern Asia referred to as the Golden Crescent. Afghanistan has been the primary
producer in the world of opium since 1991 (Chouvy, 2006). An estimated 85% to 94% of
all opium in the world is cultivated in Afghanistan (Chouvy, 2006; United Nations Report
on Drug and Crime, 2009). The cultivation and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan has
been a source of funding for the insurgency since the United States led invasion in 2001
(Medler,2005). Previous literature on the subject has demonstrated evidence that Afghan
insurgency activities are fueled by proceeds from the illegal heroin trade. A brief history
of Afghanistan starting with the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979 is an integral
component of understanding why and how the drug trade is circular in nature and to show
how the drug trade and insurgency feed off of each other. The historical economics of
Afghanistan are vital to examine since opium cultivation accounts for almost half of the
gross domestic product for the country (UNODC, 2003).
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and changed the country's entire
economic focus for the next thirty years. Prior to the Soviet invasion, opium cultivation
and trafficking were not a central feature of the Afghan economy (Carpenter, 2004;
Chouvy, 2006). The Soviet occupation and subsequent insurgency by Islamic forces
devastated the countries infrastructure (Carpenter, 2004). Previous studies have shown
due to the destruction of Afghanistan's infrastructure, traditional forms of agriculture and
other economic activities were not possible. During the occupation, the Soviets
destroyed established social institutions in Afghanistan and created what Carpenter
(2004) described as "widespread economic chaos" (Carpenter, 2004, p. 4). The brutal
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tactics employed by the Soviets included "bombing villages, burning crops, slaughtering
livestock and displacing large numbers of people" (Carpenter, 2004, p. 5). These tactics
angered the Afghan population and helped fuel the fight to remove the Soviets from the
country.
The use of these brutal tactics led to the formation ofthe anti-Soviet Afghan
resistance, which needed money to fund their efforts. The resistance discovered that
trafficking in opium provided them both a substantial and a reliable source of income
(Carpenter, 2004). From these beginnings, in a relatively short period of time,
Afghanistan became the largest producer of opium in the world. Even after the Soviets
left in 1989, the various Afghan political factions waged a battle for control of
Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the radical Islamic Taliban emerged as the victor in the
Afghan Civil War for control of the country (Carpenter, 2004; Schweich, 2008). During
the Afghan civil war, all of the warring factions were heavily involved in the opium trade
to finance their war efforts (Bagley, 2004; Carpenter, 2004; Taylor, 2006).
Once the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the Taliban passed an edict in 2001
that "banned the cultivation of opium under pain of death" (Carpenter, 2004, p. 4). The
Taliban had ulterior motives for doing so. During the civil war, the Taliban had
stockpiled large quantities of opium to create a temporary scarcity of opium on the world
market. This scarcity produced higher opium prices that boosted Taliban revenues
(Carpenter, 2004; Schweich, 2008). In late 2001, in response to the 9111 terrorist attacks,
the United States and its allies in the Northern Alliance overthrew the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Since this time, Taliban opium cultivation has grown to record numbers
(Carpenter, 2004; Chouvy, 2006; Schweich, 2008).
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According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (2003) Opium
Survey, the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan alone amounts to $2.3 billion dollars per
year, which is more than half of Afghanistan's legitimate gross domestic product. It is
estimated that 6% to 8% of the Afghan population is involved either directly or indirectly
in the drug trade. However, when taken into account the role of the extended family and
clan structure in Afghan society, that percentage likely jumps to 20% to 30% of the
population (Carpenter, 2004).
According to the 2003 UNODC Opium Survey, the concentration of opium
cultivation is in the central and southern regions of Afghanistan. Opium was also being
cultivated in the Northern region along the eastern border with Pakistan and Tajikistan.
However, the 2009 UNODC Opium Survey found that the Northern regions of
Afghanistan are virtually poppy cultivation free. The concentration of opium cultivation
is now in the southern region where the insurgency is concentrated (Bagley, 2004;
Taylor, 2006).
Understanding the past thirty years of Afghanistan'S history is integral to
understanding the purpose of this study. By examining the history of Afghanistan, the six
components of the heroin trade can be examined as a circular circuit. The historical
record has shown that there have been disruptions or breaks in the heroin trade in the past
and that various groups have used the heroin trade a source of funding.
Previous literature has focused on the heroin trade from a variety of perspectives.
One prominent viewpoint suggests that since cultivating poppies in Afghanistan is more
financially lucrative than any other crop, it is difficult to implement a policy of
substituting a different crop (Carpenter, 2004). The Afghan government has attempted to
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pay fanners not to cultivate their tields with poppies and that has not worked. To date,
there has been little to no successful crop substitution on any noticeable scale in
Afghanistan (Taylor, 2006). Due to a variety of reasons, crop substitution is simply not
viable in a country with such a poor infrastructure and crop irrigation system (Ward et aI,
2008). Crop eradication has also been attempted half-heartedly. In 2006, Afghan
president Hamid Karzai authorized opium crop eradication on the ground but would not
approve aerial eradication, even though aerial crop eradication is more effective than
ground eradication (Taylor, 2006).
Since the Afghan government is incapable of projecting power in the southern and
central regions ofthe country, the fanners take the money from the Afghan government
to not grow poppies and then the drug lords come in and tell the farmers that they must
still grow poppies. Farmers cannot go to the government for help since the government
cannot project their power into the drug-lord-controlled regions. Since the drug lords are
able to project power over the farmers in the regions the drug lords control, the farmers
are left with no choice but to grow poppies.
For many years, Afghan drug lords projected a false image of Afghan fanners,
suggesting that poppy cultivation protected them from starvation. This image was used to
influence fanners in supporting poppy cultivation and the ensuing drug trade (Carpenter,
2004; Bagley, 2004; Taylor, 2006). While income gained from poppy cultivation does
help fanners, prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghan fanners grew wheat, cotton and
vegetables, all of which currently are in severe short supply in Afghanistan (Schweich,
2008). In 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) arrived at a
startling conclusion. The UNODC produced a map showing that poppy cultivation had
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become concentrated in the southern regions of Afghanistan, which was more associated
with the insurgency and drug lords than with poverty (Schweich, 2008).
The image of the starving farmer having to cultivate poppies in order to survive
took a severe hit. The UNODC report showed that poor farmers were abandoning the
poppy crop and that the poppy cultivation was concentrated in the wealthier Southern
region of Afghanistan (UNODC, 2007). The UNODC report went on to show that close
to 80% of the land devoted to the cultivation of poppies had been planted in 2005 and
2006 (UNODC, 2007). The Afghan government insisted that they still needed more
humanitarian aid to help their destitute farmers, even after having been shown the
UNODC report and corresponding cultivation maps. The UNODC report was a wake-up
call to the US Pentagon. The report clearly showed that poppy cultivation was no longer
associated with humanitarian aid but was more closely associated with funding the
insurgency and war (Schweich, 2008; UNODC, 2007).
Several months after the 2007 UNODC report, the UNODC issued a discussion
paper that reinforced the findings of the 2007 report. The report was titled "Is poverty
driving the Afghan opium boom?" The report found that poverty was not the main factor
in the expansion of opium cultivation. The vast majority of Afghan farmers in
Afghanistan choose to grow licit crops instead of poppy (UNODC, 2008). The report
concluded that the rise in cultivation occurred in the wealthier southern regions of
Afghanistan, which have a large exposure to the insurgency. Therefore, it was this
exposure to the insurgency and not poverty that drove farmers to cultivate poppies
(UNODC, 2008).
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According to Mansfield (2001), poppy cultivation is appealing to farmers since it
is a non-perishable, low weight-height product and it is ideally suited to the war-ravaged
physical infrastructure of Afghanistan. More so, opium as an annual crop has a virtually
guaranteed market and provides a degree of economic security to farmers which other
crops like fruit and vegetables cannot offer (Mansfield, 2001). Farmers have an
economic incentive to grow poppies since the average annual household income in
Afghanistan is approximately $2,000 US per year (Ward et aI, 2008). If Afghan farmers
have a sustainable non-perishable crop, they will be able to live and support their
families.
At the heart of the Afghan drug trade is the cultivation of opium. Developing
ways or methods to reduce and then ban opium cultivation would be a central tenet of any
anti-narcotic eradication program. However, numerous authors to date, including Ward,
Mansfield, Oldham and Byrd (2008) have stated any kind of attempt to seriously reduce
opium cultivation is hindered by the extreme weakness of modem Afghan institutions,
widespread corruption and inability of the Afghan government to enforce rule of law
throughout the country. Anti-narcotic efforts by Afghan law enforcement and the
legitimate Afghan government with the assistance from the U.S. led coalition forces have
tried to stop poppy cultivation since the invasion in 2001, with poor results (Ward et aI,
2008)
Since the farmers are primarily responsible for the first level of the six steps of the
drug trade, understanding the farmers' reasons for growing poppies is essential to any
counter-narcotic strategy. If poppies aren't cultivated, they cannot be refined and,
therefore, heroin cannot be produced. Moreover, no money will be made in the
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transportation, distribution or sale of the heroin. There will be no money going back to
the drug lords, who will then have no money to funnel or donate to support the
insurgency. The discontinuation of poppy cultivation would produce a break in the
circuit. The drug trade would grind to a halt if the primary ingredient of the main product
was not being cultivated.
Conversely, if there were a destabilized Afghanistan, then there would be no
government interference in opium cultivation since the government would be unable to
project its authority over the areas controlled by the drug lords. The drug lords could
force farmers to grow as much poppy as the drug lords want. Cultivation would increase,
and there would be further destabilization of the country produced by a battle for control
of the drug trade amongst Afghan drug lords. Afghanistan would become a narco-state
where rule of law would not be possible to impose. The insurgency would have free
reign to do whatever it wanted. Afghanistan would once again become a breeding
ground for terrorists, and the security threat posed by the Central Asian region would
dramatically increase.
According to the UNODC World Drug Report (2010), over 90% of the opiateprocessing laboratories in the world are located in Afghanistan. One of the key
components to refining opiates from poppies into heroin is a precursor chemical known
as acetic anhydride. According to the annual UNODC World Drug Report (UNODC
2008, 2009 and 2010), all acetic anhydride has to be smuggled into Afghanistan. There is
no known production facility in the country, nor is there any reported legitimate use for
this chemical in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010). Since 2007 there has been an
international cooperation on not allowing the diversion of precursor chemicals to drug-
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producing countries, particularly Afghanistan. The controls that have been put in place
by the international community have led to the price of a single liter of acetic anhydride
in Afghanistan to fluctuate between $350 and $400 per liter (UNODC, 2010). This steep
price for precursor chemicals is thought to have become a major cost factor in refining
heroin (UNODC, 2009).
Acetic anhydride is packaged in liter-sized glass bottles, five-gallon sized metal
canisters and 55-gallon steel drums. The majority of the chemical is smuggled into
Afghanistan via Pakistan (Strategypage.com, 2010). Once the chemical arrives in
Pakistan, the acetic anhydride is transported into Afghanistan. Transportation is done via
truck due to the weight, size and amounts needed for refinement. Due to the limited
number of available roads, border guards at these crossing points are accustomed to be
being bribed. Ten tons of raw opium can be refined into approximately 1.3 tons of
heroin. To refine this quantity of raw opium takes 2.6 tons of acetic anhydride
(Startegypage.com, 2010). Due to the large quantity of acetic anhydride needed to refine
the heroin, a break in the acquisition of the chemical would cause the drug trade to come
to a halt, representing another break in the circuit. This theory was partially proved out in
the 1990s. While the civil war waged in Afghanistan, Pakistan curtailed the supply of
acetic anhydride going to Afghanistan. Opium was still cultivated and produced in
Afghanistan during this time, but the heroin destined for the far more lucrative foreign
markets was not as readily available and the prices of heroin rose in the 1990s (Reuter &
Trautmann, 2009; Stratgeypage.com, 2010).
The second step in the drug trade is the refinement and production of the raw
opium poppies into heroin. Any interruption in the refinement and production of opium
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into heroin causes a break in the circuit. If chemicals needed to refine the raw opium are
not getting into Afghanistan, then the heroin cannot be produced. If the heroin cannot be
produced, then there is no product to transport, distribute or sell. There are no profits to
be made, therefore there are no profits that are getting back to the drug lords. If they are
not receiving money, they are unable to give funding to the insurgency.
Refinement of opium into heroin is primarily done in Afghanistan. The major
chemical precursor acetic anhydride is needed to refine the opium into heroin. Acetic
anhydride is not manufactured in Afghanistan and needs to be smuggled into the country.
Without acetic anhydride, refining opium into heroin would not be possible. Disrupting
the flow of acetic anhydride into Afghanistan would cause a break in the circuit. This
break has happened in the past when Pakistan had shut down its border with Afghanistan
and stopped the flow of acetic anhydride into the country.
The third step in the drug trade is the transportation of heroin out of Afghanistan
into the world market. This is an area where corruption and geography playa vital role.
From a geographic perspective, Afghanistan is a land-locked country. It is surrounded by
Pakistan to the east, southeast and the south, Iran to the south and southwest,
Turkmenistan to the northwest, Uzbekistan to the north and Tajikistan to the north as well
(CIA, 2010). All of these countries have suffered as a result of the opium trade and some
have gone to great lengths in an attempt to stop the flow of drugs. Iran in particular has
the highest opioid dependency in the world due to its close proximity to inexpensive
partially refined heroin and raw Afghan opium (Pagel, 2009).
As a result of this high dependency, Iran constructed a $6 billion wall along its
western border with Afghanistan in an attempt to cut off a major trafficking route of the
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Afghan drug lords (Pagel, 2009). However, due to the pervasive culture of corruption
amongst the local officials, coupled with the increased opium production in Afghanistan
since the fall of the Taliban, such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Iran's antinarcotic efforts are an example of a single-scope approach to the drug trade. Iran's effort
was an attempt to break the circuit by cutting off major drug trafficking routes.
Due to the countries surrounding Afghanistan, these border countries are directly
involved in the transportation of heroin leaving the region. The countries surrounding
Afghanistan have been adversely affected by the heroin trade, particularly Iran, which has
the highest opium dependency in the world (Pagel, 2009). Iran attempted to disrupt the
flow of heroin by building a wall along its border with Afghanistan. Iran attempted to
break the circuit by shutting down its borders. However, due to rampant corruption in the
region, this effort has been less successful than hoped.
Corruption is rampant in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan, located to the
east of Afghanistan, is generally considered a failed state by the world community
(Medler,2005). For that reason, Pakistan is viewed as being incapable of any meaningful
counter-narcotics efforts and the lawless lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan are
proof of this (Taylor, 2006). Pakistan is a major crossover point for drugs flowing out of
Afghanistan and for money and chemicals needed to break down the opium coming back
into Afghanistan. Historically, the people that populate the border between Afghanistan
and Pakistan share a common ethnic and cultural makeup, and smuggling has been a way
of life for these peoples for decades (Medler, 2005). Pay for civil servants in Pakistan is
poor and paying bribes to civil servants is common (Medler, 2005; Jones, 2008). Even
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more so, along the more remote border areas, bribes are paid to border guards and law
enforcement as normal course of business (Medler, 2005).
In Afghanistan, the government is unable to provide basic services to its people,
the security forces cannot protect local villages and the population is losing faith in the
government (Jones, 2007). The Afghan government is unable to enforce any sustained
and lasting anti-narcotic efforts against the drug lords. The government's inability to lead
feeds the corruption that is plaguing the country as well as further destabilizing the
country (Jones, 2007). By its own inabilities, the Afghan government aids the drug trade
(Taylor, 2007).
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are all parts of the former Soviet Union.
All three are considered some of the poorest countries in the world. Per capita income in
2009 for Turkmenistan was $3,420, compared with $2,890 for Uzbekistan and $700 for
Tajikistan (World Bank, 2009). Due to such low income, corruption is prevalent in these
former Soviet states. The low wages paid to border guards, police and local government
officials helps proliferate the drug trade (Bagley, 2004; Medler, 2005).
Corruption is rampant in all the bordering countries around Afghanistan. The
amount of money that drug lords pay the border guards, police and local officials is an
insignificant fraction of the value of the heroin that is being trafficked (Ward et aI, 2008).
Yet to the border guards, police and local officials, the payoff money they receive is a
large sum of money. Due to the poor pay that civil servants receive in these countries,
the drug lords are able to easily bribe the civil servants to allow their shipments to go
through. The borders in all of these countries are porous, and the effective policing of
these borders is hindered by the poor pay that is paid to police (Medler, 2005).
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Without the culture of corruption that is rampant in Afghanistan and the
surrounding countries, the heroin trade would not be able to flourish. Corruption plays its
part in the transporting of heroin out of Afghanistan and the smuggling of needed
supplies to refine heroin into Afghanistan. Low wages paid to border guards, police and
local officials contribute greatly to the problem of corruption. The low per capita income
in surrounding countries further aids the proliferation of corruption. Eliminating the
culture of corruption in these countries would aid in disrupting the flow of heroin out of
Afghanistan and the flow of supplies into the country. This would result in another break
in the circuit.
The drug trafficking networks that exist in Central Asia have been in use for many
years and simultaneously shutting down all of these routes is not possible or feasible
(Medler, 2005; Taylor, 2006). This third step of the drug trade is the most difficult place
to break the circuit, due to the numerous countries and trafficking routes that are
involved. In the 1990s, when Pakistan shut its borders down to drug trafficking, the
trafficking shifted to Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Taylor, 2006).
Pakistan attempted to break the circuit, but due to the numerous alternate trafficking
routes, heroin still flowed out of Afghanistan and the drug trade continued.
The fourth step in the drug trade is the distribution and sale of heroin in the
consumer or end cities. According to the 2011 UNODC World Drug Report, UNODC
estimates that there were between 12 and 21 million opiate users worldwide in 2009. This
same report showed that in 2009, an estimated 375 metric tons of heroin were consumed
by those users. This was up from 2005 when the 2005 UNODC World Drug Report
showed 12-14 million opiate users worldwide. "Opiate users generated an estimated $68
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billion dollars in revenue for drug traffickers in 2009 with $60 billion of that from
Afghan opiates" (UNODC, 2011, p. 45). While the Afghan drug lords have a substantial
influence on the Afghan economy, the largest profits in the heroin trade stem from the
international traffickers, not the Afghan drug lords themselves (UNODC, 2011). The
international drug traffickers distribute the drugs to the consumer countries. Despite the
fact that the Afghan drug lords account for only a small slice of heroin trade profits
globally, their slice is powerful in Afghanistan due to the poor socio-economic conditions
and the low per capita income in Afghanistan. The amount of money that the drug lords
are making compared to the average Afghan citizen is astronomical (Schweich, 2008).
Consumption of heroin is on the rise. The United States is the primary export
country for Afghan heroin (UNODC, 2011). Interestingly enough, poppy production has
fallen in 2011 (UNODC), however, that was due to crop disease of poppy fields and not
due to a lessening of demand by consumers. Countries throughout the world have tried to
stop the import of illegal drugs, but these prohibitionist strategies and policies have done
next to nothing to stem the flow of drugs (Carpenter, 2004; Chouvy, 2006: Taylor, 2006).
As long as there is a demand for illegal heroin and there is such an immense lucrative
profit to be made in drug trafficking, the heroin will continue to flow (Taylor, 2006).
The number of heroin users worldwide is on the rise. Opiate users in 2009
generated profits of $68 billion dollars with $60 billion of that coming from Afghan
opiates. The split on the profits from the heroin trade vary with the Afghan drug lords
receive a smaller share of the profits in comparison to the distributors and traffickers
themselves. However, the profits made by the Afghan drug lords are incredibly high for
the region when compared to per capita income. Disruption of these distribution
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networks would cause a break in the circuit. Examining these factors provides insight
into ways to possibly disrupt or break the circuit of the heroin trade.
Organized crime is heavily involved in the drug trade (UNODC, 2004). These
criminal networks are well-organized and structured. This structured system makes the
distribution and sale of the drugs easier to accomplish. These organized crime groups
purchase heroin wholesale from the drug lords once it has left Afghanistan (Medler,
2005). The heroin is not purchased in Afghanistan; rather, it is purchased at exit
locations along the smuggling routes. The heroin is concealed inside shipments of
legitimate goods and moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan, where the heroin is then
transported by road and rail to the main Pakistani port of Karachi (Medler, 2005). The
port of Karachi is a major international shipment hub that moves high volumes of
containerized cargo and bulk goods, as well as contraband like drugs and weapons
(Medler, 2005).
It is at this point in the drug trade, step number five, where the money begins to

flow back to the drug lords. The money flow extends outward to the surrounding
countries of Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tjikistan, Turkmenitsan, Turkey, Ukraine and
Russia. These travel and exit countries are where the Afghan drug lords are paid for their
goods (Mullen, 2010). These are countries where the wholesaling of Afghan heroin
occurs, with most of the heroin being sold to transnational organized crime groups
(Medler, 2005). Afghan drug lords deal in cash. There is no wiring of funds to an
account in some offshore country. Cash is smuggled back into Afghanistan along the
same routes that the heroin was smuggled out on (Ward, et aI, 2008). Once again, due to
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the porous borders of all of these countries, the profits get back into the hands of the
Afghan drug lords (Mullen, 2010).
A break in the money-How circuit would cause the drug trade to grind to a halt.
The money generated by the drug trade is used to keep financing the drug trade (Medler,
2005). The money that comes back into Afghanistan is used to pay for chemicals to
break down the poppies, bribe border guards, police and local officials, pay the people
that the drug lords employ, fatten the coffers of the drug lords and to fund the insurgency
(UNODC,2008). With no money coming back to the drug lords, they would be unable
to pay the farmers to cultivate poppy, purchase the acetic anhydride to refine the opium
into heroin, or bribe the border guards, police and local officials along the smuggling
routes, and the drug lords would not have money to give to the insurgency.
The money generated from the sale of Afghan heroin Hows back to the drug lords
along the same routes that the heroin left the country. These funds are used for paying
the farmers, bribing the border guards, funding the insurgency and fattening the coffers of
the drug lords. If there is a disruption of the How of money, it affects the entire heroin
trade. A disruption in the How of money causes a break in the circuit. No money coming
into Afghanistan would mean that the drug lords would be unable to pay for the
cultivation of poppies and not be able to afford the necessary chemicals needed to refine
the heroin. This break in the circuit would cause the drug trade to come to a halt until the
circuit could be reestablished.
The sixth and final step in the drug trade is the giving of funds by drug lords to
the insurgents. When the Taliban was in charge of Afghanistan, the government received
funding from the drug lords by taxing all aspects of the drug trade (Cilluffo, 2000). The
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Taliban taxed the opium harvest, the refining laboratories and the transportation of the
heroin to all exit points out of the country (Cilluffo, 2000). Currently, it is not known as
far as an exact figure how much money is being given to the insurgency by the drug
lords. There is no bank statement from a drug lord that will show they gave "X" amount
of dollars to the insurgency in a given month. Previous authors have concluded that
money is being provided to the insurgency to fund their efforts against the Afghan
government and coalition forces (Ward et aI, 2008).
In 2004, John Walters, who was the Director for White House Office of Drug
Control Policy said, "drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan are undermining the
rule of law and putting money in the pockets of the terrorists we are trying to neutralize,"
(Bagley, 2004, p. 5). The insurgency is comprised of various groups, with many of them
being former Taliban. According to Schmidt (2010), "although the Taliban did not
mastermind the drug trade, it is clear that they benefit from it financially" (Schmidt,
2010, p. 63). Schmidt (2010) concluded the Taliban "use revenues generated by it to
purchase new weapons and pick up new recruits in Pakistan. Once the Taliban's
financial arteries linked to the poppy are cut off, it will experience a major blow to its
organization" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 63). Experts, including Taylor (2004) and Johnson
(2007), agree that the opium trade funded terrorism, inhibited reconstruction and created
a financial and locally supported power base for the insurgency to launch attacks on
coalition forces, further destabilizing the government and the country.
Schmidt (2010) stated that since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, one thing has
become clear: the new Taliban have been active participants and "have aided and abetted
opium cultivation on a scale unmatched to anything Afghanistan has produced in the
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past" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 62). For example, in 1999 Afghanistan produced 4,500 tons of
opium, which is 15 times the output of the preceding 20 years (UNODC, 2001). The
business partnership between the drug lords and the Taliban has grown deeper since the
invasion in 2001. The lack of trust among Afghanistan's citizens in the Afghan
government has also given opium value (Schmidt, 2010). Krutzmann observed that
"opium is not only a commodity, but also a currency at the same time. Poppy is the
lifeblood of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 63).
Previous literature has shown that the heroin trade has funded the Taliban when
they were in power as well as providing funding to the current insurgency. The
insurgency has been at the forefront of attacking the Afghan government as well as
coalition forces. These attacks have led to destabilization of the Afghan government as
well as the country itself. Since the major source of insurgency funding is the heroin
trade, disruptions of the trade affects the insurgency. Without the funding provided by
the heroin trade the insurgency would be unable to purchase weapons, ammunition and
bomb-making materials. Lack of these resources would inhibit their ability to launch
attacks and further their attempts to destabilize Afghanistan.
The UNODC reports from 2005 thru 2010 showed that opium cultivation more
than doubled between 2005 and 2007, from 4,000 metric tons to 8,200 metric tons. Since
2008, the cultivation has decreased back to the levels seen in 2005 (UNODC, 2010)
where 4,000 metric tones of opium were cultivated. Previous authors, including Taylor
(2007) and Schmidt (2010), stated that the insurgency activities against the Afghan
government and the coalition forces increased greatly in the years between 2005 and
2007. The numbers of attacks increased, as did the number of casualties resulting from
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these attacks (Schmidt, 2010). Coincidently, other authors have argued that the decline in
insurgent attacks resulted from the "surge" of United States troops in 2010, coupled with
the diseases that hit the poppy crop in 2009 (Stenersen, 2010). Regardless, the fact
remains that the drug lords give money and aid to the insurgency.
A break in the circuit of money going to the Afghan insurgency would have an
impact on the entire Afghan drug trade. Since the insurgents themselves have become
immersed in the drug trade, if money did not come back to them, they would not be able
to fund their efforts against the Afghan government and the coalition forces. The
partnership with the drug lords could fall into jeopardy, resulting in a turf war between
the insurgents and drug lords for control of the drug trade. Under such circumstances, the
insurgency would step up their attacks to get the money flowing in and the drugs flowing
out of Afghanistan, further destabilizing an already unstable country. This set of
circumstances clearly illustrates the circular nature of the Afghan drug trade and the
Afghan insurgency and shows how the common goal of these groups to further
destabilize Afghanistan binds them in an ongoing, mutually reliant relationship.
Examining the previous literature on the Afghan heroin trade forms the launching
point of this study. Understanding the historical and economical significance of the six
components of the heroin trade is vital to understanding the purpose of this study. The
circular nature of the heroin trade is examined. Breaking the circuit of the circle or
disrupting the circuit causes a halt to the drug trade. A stop in the drug trade means a
stop to the funding provided to the insurgency. Destabilization and corruption play their
part in the heroin trade and need to be included since without both of them, the heroin
trade would be hard-pressed to flourish the way it currently does.
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Methods
Methodology

Babbie (2010) stated that the purpose of most types of social research is to find
out the unknovvTI. The unknown that this study seeks to find is if there is a circular
pattern to the Afghan Heroin trade and to see what roles corruption and destabilization
play in the trade. In order to provide a sufficient amount of information on this subject,
exploratory means will be utilized to familiarize the researcher with the topic (Babbie,
2010). The exploratory means of this study include second source data from peerreviewed journals, scholarly articles, World Drug Reports, published books, websites and
newsprint articles.
A qualitative research approach will be utilized to examine and answer the
research questions in this study. According to Babbie (2010), the research conducted
seeks to provide answers to a phenomenon. In the case of this study the phenomenon is
the heroin trade. The results obtained through the use of qualitative research will help
answer the research questions that have been posed. Furthermore, since an aspect of
exploratory research is, "to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study,"
(Babbie, 2010, p. 92), the information gleaned from this study may lead to further
research on the circular nature of the Afghan heroin trade and the roles of destabilization
and corruption in the Afghan heroin trade.
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Research Design

This research is a qualitative examination of the circular nature of the various
components of the heroin drug trade in Afghanistan. The research is designed to identify
independent variables such as opium cultivation, the production of opium into heroin, the
transportation of heroin to the world market, the distribution and sales of heroin in end
cities, the movement of profits from the sale of heroin back to the drug lords, and the
provision of funds by the drug lords to the insurgency. This research addresses the
following research questions:
RQ 1 Is there is a circular pattern to the Afghan drug trade and the insurgency? RQ2
What role do destabilization and corruption play in the heroin trade and insurgency in
Afghanistan?
Procedure

Babbie (2010) defined content analysis as, "the study of recorded human
communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws" (Babbie, 2010, p. 333).
Based on a detailed content analysis of the Afghan heroin trade, I was able to demarcate
the steps in heroin manufacture and distribution of heroin. The electrical circuit provides
a convenient metaphor for understanding and discussing the Afghan heroin trade.
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Results

This researched addressed the question of whether a circular pattern exists
between the Afghan drug trade and the insurgency. The answer to that question is a
resounding "yes." The drug trade starts with the farmers who cultivate the poppies. The
next step is to process and refine the opium into heroin, which takes place primarily in
Afghanistan. Chemicals are needed to refine the opium into heroin. These chemicals
need to be smuggled into Afghanistan. The refined heroin is then transported out of
Afghanistan through neighboring countries along long used drug trafficking routes.
Corruption of police officers, border guards and local officials is part and parcel of the
drug trade and is necessary to get the heroin out into the world market.
Once the heroin leaves Afghanistan, it is transported along drug trafficking routes
through Pakistan, Iran, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is along these routes
that the majority of heroin is purchased by drug traffickers who pay a wholesale price for
the heroin. These traffickers are primarily transnational organized crime groups that have
the means, ability, organization and money to get the drugs out the end cities for
distribution and sale to the eventual heroin consumer. Price markups for the heroin occur
all along the transportation and distribution network. Chossudovsky (2005) stated the
amount of money generated by the heroin trade once it leaves Afghanistan is between 80
to 100 times what the Afghan farmer was paid to cultivate the crop.
The money generated from the wholesale of the heroin flows back to the Afghan
drug lords along the same path that the drugs exited the country. In addition to the heroin
profits, chemicals such as acetic anhydride needed to break down and refine opium
poppies are transported back into Afghanistan. Once again, corruption plays its role in
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allowing the money and supplies to go back into Afghanistan. The profits that drug lords
get back from the sale of the heroin gives them the ability to fund the insurgency. The
more money that the drug lords earn means that they have more money to give to the
insurgency. More money to the insurgency means they are able to conduct more attacks,
which further destabilizes Afghanistan and gets the insurgency closer to their goal of a
destabilized Afghanistan. Any break in this circular flow of drugs and money causes a
major disruption to the Afghan drug trade, which in turn ripples down to the insurgency
and their ability to get funding and launch attacks.
A break anywhere in the circle affects the flow of heroin out of Afghanistan and
flow of money back into Afghanistan. A break in the circuit was defined as any type of
anti-narcotic law enforcement actions aimed at stopping the flow of drugs out of
Afghanistan, disrupting distribution and transportation networks, growing of poppies to
produce heroin or the refinement of poppies into heroin. According to the UNODC
World Drug Report (2011) the number of heroin seizures doubled between 2005 and
2009. In 2005,348 metric tons of heroin were seized and that number increased to 653
metric tons in 2009. There was a major increase in opium production in Afghanistan
between 2005 and 2007 and since more heroin was being produced and transported, there
was more chances for law enforcement to interdict and seize the illegal drugs (UNODC,
2011).
Any break in the circuit has implications for all facets of the drug trade. Since the
drug trade is so inter-connected, any kind of disruption or break at one point affects the
other components. For example, when Pakistan shut its border with Afghanistan in the
1990s, the primary export route for Afghan heroin was cut-off, as was the avenue of
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money corning back into Afghanistan. This interrupted the flow of drugs from the
country as well as the money corning back in. This also affected the Taliban government
since they taxed the drug trade and lost income when the border was shut down.
For a time, the Afghan drug trade carne to a halt until the drug lords were able to
re-establish and start using alternative trafficking routes through Iran, Tajikstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The new trafficking routes re-established the circuit, but
at a cost. The new trafficking routes resulted in additional expenses incurred by the drug
lords in order to move their drugs and get their money. The drug lords had to pay bribes
to border guards, police and local officials in areas where they did not have to be paid
when the Pakistan border was open. New routes for the trafficking meant establishing
and building new relationships along the alternate routes.
Another potential break in the circuit could be produced by a reduction in poppy
production. Whether through eradication efforts by law enforcement or crop failure due
to drought or disease, the lack of poppy production would result in a lack of drug to
refine, transport, distribute, sell or yield profits to the Afghan drug lords. All along the
heroin trade, from poppy cultivation to heroin consumption by users, each group involved
in the trade makes money, so reduced poppy production not only affects Afghan drug
lords but individuals and organized crime groups all along the production cycle, from
bribed border guards to international traffickers.
Since acetic anhydride is a primary chemical needed to refine opium to heroin, if
it is unable to be smuggled into Afghanistan, heroin could not be produced. If there is no
heroin then there is nothing to transport, distribute or sell. If there is nothing to sell then
there is no profit to profit from. No profits will then get back to the drug lords who will
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then have no money to fund the insurgency. The insurgency will not have the funds it
needs to achieve its goals and will have to look to other sources for funding its activities.
If there is a break in any of the six components of the drug trade circle, the drug trade
comes to a halt until the break can be fixed, by-passed or re-established.
The second question posed was regarding the roles corruption and destabilization
play in the circle. Numerous authors, including Bagley (2004), Taylor (2006), Jones
(2007), Pagel (2009) and Mullen (2010), have stated that corruption in Afghanistan is
absolutely essential for the drug trade to exist and flourish. All of these authors agree
that without the levels of corruption that exist in Afghanistan, the drug trade would not be
as profitable or at all possible as it has been to date. The corruption goes to the heart of
the destabilization of Afghanistan. The Afghan government is viewed by many of the
citizens of Afghanistan as corrupt and not trustworthy. This attitude by Afghan citizens
is prevalent since the legitimate Afghan government is incapable of enforcing the rule of
law or providing the basic services to its citizenry. Without the support and backing of
its people, the Afghan government inadvertently feeds the insurgency. The insurgency is
able to recruit bodies and sympathizers to their cause, which helps the insurgents reach
their end goal: a destabilized Afghanistan.
Transparency International's corruption index in 2010 listed Afghanistan in
position 176 out of 178. The only countries that had higher levels of corruption were
Myanmar and Somalia. Tajikistan was listed in position 152, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan were listed in position 172, Pakistan was listed in position 143, and Iran was
listed in position 146 (Transparency International, 2010). With such high levels of
corruption in all of these countries, any kind of anti-narcotic law enforcement will face
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Discussion/Conclusion

Previous research on the subject of the heroin drug trade in Afghanistan has
shown that the insurgency benefits financially from the drug trade. Financial benefit
from the heroin drug trade goes back to the mujahidin resistance fighters who fought
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The ensuing participants in the civil war
after the Soviets departed also benefited from the drug trade, including the eventual
winner of that civil war, the Taliban. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the
insurgency that has risen against the Afghan government has also been benefiting from
the drug trade.
The aim of this study was to reflect that the Afghan heroin trade is similar to a
circular electrical circuit. A break or disruption anywhere in the circuit causes a halt in
the drug trade until the circuit is re-established. A disruption can include disease of the
poppy crop, shutting down of drug trafficking routes, seizure of heroin by law
enforcement, disruption in the supply lines into Afghanistan of chemicals needed to
refine opium into heroin, or any of the other factors reviewed in this study.
History has shown that there have been times over the past 30 years where the
heroin trade has been temporarily halted. The key to the last statement is "temporarily."
In recent history, there has not been a time when heroin was not being trafficked out of
Afghanistan. Future research can focus on a multi-scope approach to disrupting the
circuit at numerous points and not just focusing on one of the six areas of the circle. In
World War II, when the Allies invaded France on D-Day, there was a multi-pronged front
that stretched the lines of the Germans. The idea behind this was to stretch the lines so
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thin that eventually a break could be made in the German lines and the Allies would be
able to advance off the beaches and into France.
The same multi-scope approach can be used to attack the heroin trade. Break one
circuit and it temporarily stops the drug trade. However, break two, three or four circuits
and the trade will come to a standstill. Similarly, if you blow a breaker in an electrical
panel, power is shut down until you can flip the breaker switch in the panel. If you blow
three, four or five breakers, there is a high probability that the entire electrical panel will
have to be replaced. This is a large project, requiring a person with specific technical
skills and it takes longer to rectify than just switching a breaker switch. When the circuit
has been broken is the time when the drug trade is most vulnerable.
Much has been written on the corruption that plagues not only Afghanistan but
also the surrounding countries of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. The drug trade and the insurgency feed off of the corruption. The Afghan
government inadvertently feeds the insurgency and the drug trade by its inability to
govern and project its legitimate authority throughout the country. The Afghan
government's inability to provide basic services to its citizens, rebuild an infrastructure
that has been decimated by thirty years of war, and to provide security to rural Afghans
perpetuates the Afghan belief that their country is unstable and that their government is
incapable of governing. The insurgency uses this belief to recruit people to its cause.
The drug lords prefer a destabilized Afghanistan. It is better for their business if the
Afghan government is unable to mount any serious anti-narcotic efforts against them.
The longer the Afghan government is unable to project the rule of law and govern
its people, the longer the battle with the insurgents will continue. Part of stabilizing
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Afghanistan is for the Afghan government to deal with the massive corruption that is
rampant in its entire organization. Battling corruption derives two benefits for the
Afghan government. First, it shows the people that corruption will be not tolerated and
that there are criminal consequences to being involved with corruption. Battling
corruption gives the government legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry. Secondly, by
battling corruption the government is taking a key component of the heroin drug trade
away from the drug lords. If the drug lords are unable to bribe corrupt border guards,
police or local officials, then the heroin will not be able to leave the country. If the
heroin cannot be exported then there will be no distribution, transportation or sale of the
heroin. There will be no money flowing back to the drug lords, which means there will
be no money to funnel to the insurgency. The Afghan government hits the insurgency
where it will feel it the most, in their funding pockets. For the Afghan government,
battling corruption is win-win.
Studying the heroin trade as a circular pattern provides insight into a problem that
has had devastating effects in Afghanistan and the surrounding countries, as well as every
country and end city throughout the world where Afghan heroin ends up being consumed.
Finding ways to stop the flow of heroin out of Afghanistan and the flow of money into
Afghanistan by using this circular approach to the heroin trade will aid law enforcement
in anti-narcotic measures and operations. Less heroin mean less profits for the drug
lords, which will mean less money to give to the insurgency. Less money for the
insurgency means less of an ability on their part to launch attacks, which further
destabilize the country. This in tum will allow the Afghan government the ability to
project power throughout the country, including areas currently controlled by the drug
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lords, thereby unifying the fractured country. Less heroin being produced also means
less heroin available for consumption. In the end, by reducing or eliminating the supply,
the demand may also go down. This would benefit the drug treatment budget of every
end city where heroin is being sold and consumed.
The two primary social powers in Afghanistan are the legitimate Afghan
government and the heroin trading drug lords. Afghan citizens fall under the control of
one group or the other. Currently, the legitimate Afghan government is unable to provide
rule of law and social order to all parts of the country. This is due in part to the
government's own inabilities due to internal corruption and the power and influence of
the Afghan drug lords. Since the Afghan drug lords are in control of the southern drug
producing areas of the country, they are able to exert social control over the population.
The Afghan government and drug lords are diametrically opposed when it comes to their
ideas and values. For these reasons, Conflict Theory is an appropriate criminological
theory to use when researching the heroin trade.
Using this study as a jumping off point, future research should focus on ways to
interrupt or break the circuit of the heroin trade. Each component should be studied in
order to find weak links in the component and ways for law enforcement to exploit those
weak links in order to disrupt or break the circle of the drug trade. Once each weakness
of the various components has been identified, a multiple-pronged approach to disrupt or
break the various components of the heroin trade simultaneously should be a focus. A
multi-pronged approach to the heroin trade will give law enforcement the greatest chance
of success in eliminating the heroin trade.
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